Ethics of Intervention Roles in Community Disputes
The subject of the ethical implications of third party intervention in community disputes has been debated by several scholars and practitioners in the field. There are several factors, and basic assumptions, about the nature of the role of third parties in general which contributed to a sharp variation on the views of those scholars and practitioners. In this presentation, we will focus on two related factors or assumptions: the social function of the third party role, and consequently, the concept of neutrality.
Before discussing those factors, let us clarify that "third parties enter a conflict relationship in which the disputants have different expectations, goals, costs, and rewards, and where they experience pressures and stresses stemming from an uncertain situation, or from over-eager constituents. To propose a watertight set of categories for the intervention of third parties, without taking these factors into consideration, is in reality a futile intellectual flight of fancy, or merely an exercise in normative thinking." (Bercovitch, p.16, 1984).
The Social function of the Third Party Role and its Effect on the Concept of Neutrality:
We will summarize three positions in regard to the social functions of third party roles: 1) the Professional Position, 2) the Empowering Position, and 3) the Common Good Position. For each, we will also discuss the implications of their social views and their concepts of neutrality on different third party roles.
1. The Professional Position: This position is mainly represented by the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR). According to SPIDR, a third party is, and could not be anything other than, neutral. This is because a third party (called the Neutral in the SPIDR literature) "is a provider of services to others. The particular service a neutral provides is the use of conflict resolution skills and the neutral's status as a "disinterested" third party to assist in the resolution of disputes....The neutral who is a member of SPIDR is a member of the dispute resolution profession." (Making the Tough Call, p.6, 1991).
This view of the third party as a professional "conflict resolver" has several implications on the roles which the third party could perform. Because neutrality and disinterest are the major qualifications, a third party may intervene only in a manner that does not violate those qualifications. A third party basically assists the parties, who own the dispute and the process, to reach an agreement. Thus, mediation and arbitration are the main (only?) types of intervention.
Within those roles, the ability of the third party to deal with issues of empowerment, social change, or justice are limited. SPIDR provides very few mechanisms to deal with issues such as those mentioned. This is consistent with the emphasis on neutrality and disinterest. A third party who believes that one party is disempowered, or who believes that the outcome is unjust, may do one of two things: 1) educate the disempowered party on the process or the consequences of the outcome, or 2) withdraw. Any other roles would seem to violate the principles of neutrality and disinterest.
This Professional position was, naturally, criticized by those who advocate the empowering and common good aspects of third party intervention. Laue and Cormick, in emphasizing the importance of the political empowerment of disadvantaged parties, stated that "many intervenors...perceive their role as one of aiding in the process of making concessions in the allocation of resources rather than in helping to significantly empower powerless groups. In this regard, many professional intervenors are similar to most establishment parties: They wrongly see resources alone rather than power as the arena for change." (Laue and Cormick, p.229-230, 1978).
2. The Empowering Position: This position is held mainly by James Laue and Gerald Cormick. They determined that "justice is the ultimate social good." (Laue and Cormick, p.219, 1978). A third party intervention in community disputes should, through empowering the disadvantaged, lead to justice, which is the "prerequisite to the maximum attainment of freedom by all individuals." (Laue and Cormick, p.219, 1978). Further, their criteria for an ethical intervention is based on how it contributes "to the ability of relatively powerless individuals and groups in the situation to determine their own destinies to the greatest extent consistent with the common good." (Laue and Cormick, p.217, 1978). For them, proportional empowerment is a crucial value, upon which any successful intervention rests. As they stated, proportional empowerment "refers to a condition in which all groups have developed their latent power to the point where they can advocate their own needs and rights, where they are capable of protecting their boundaries from wanton violation by others, where they are capable of negotiating their way with other empowered groups on the sure footing of respect rather than charity. Given the fallibility of judges, sociologists, politicians, philosophers, and theologians, we can only trust that true substantive justice will flow from the procedural safeguard of proportional empowerment." (Laue and Cormick, p.220, 1978).
Based on their assumptions about the social functions of intervention, Laue and Cormick provided a larger spectrum of intervention roles. A third party plays the role that would more likely achieve the goals of empowerment and justice, even if it was not a neutral one. Thus, activism and advocacy for the cause of weaker parties in order to empower them, may be more proper than mediation or enforcement. Playing the role of a mediator, when empowerment of one party is needed, would be unethical, because it reinforces the unjust status quo.
The Empowerment position also was criticized by others who fear that too much emphasis on empowering the weak through third party intervention may become self defeating. According to Luban (1988) "too much empowering activity on the part of neutrals will lead to under-utilization of Alternative Dispute Resolution by the more powerful parties who find themselves getting goosed by the process." (Luban, p.50, 1981). In addition, Luban, like those representing the Professional position, could only perceive of a third party as neutral. Thus, he warns against mixing the role of advocacy (for empowering the weak) with other "neutral" third party roles, because advocacy, by its nature, neglects at least the interests of one party, even if that party were powerful.
The Common Good Position: This position is actually a critical modification of the Empowerment position. According to Williams (1978), social justice as the ultimate good is the goal of intervention in community disputes. However, empowerment, proportional empowerment, and participation will not necessarily lead to that destination. Williams stated that "neither participation nor competition...will significantly alter the stigma of race and the burden of poverty. Only if greater attention is given to formulation of an adequate conception of the common good or just society will the possibility of significant change emerge. In addition, a notion of the common good or just society would act to limit the misuse of power or coercion by the community or the parties to the dispute. Competition has replaced cooperation and conflict has ensued precisely because... the conception of legitimacy of power has broken down. Consequently, one aspect of the ethical responsibility of the intervenor is to restore the notion of common good that both parties to the dispute might come to acknowledge as valid and that can serve to set limits to the aspirations of all community members as well as provide a normative definition of the just society." (Williams, p.236, 1978).
Unlike Laue and Cormick, Williams did not provide models of intervention that are guided by his ethical framework. However, it may be inferred from his argument that the only ethical model of intervention would be one that upholds the common good as its constitution, to which the intervenor attempts to get the parties to accept as grounds for resolving their dispute. As he stated "the intervenor should be urged to formulate over against the parties some general conception of what seems fair or right in a particular situation. Such a tentative conception of a common good would not prevent joint determination by the parties in dispute. It would suggest instead some reasonable expectations about the transfer of power that ought to occur in the negotiations." (Williams, p.237, 1978). Thus, neutrality becomes a matter of adhering to the common good while not favoring any of the parties.
The Common Good position, although represents most of the actual conflict resolution techniques in traditional societies, would face difficulties in modern diverse societies, where the notion of common good may be too vague. Although this approach is full of good intentions, we doubt that it could stand the test of reality; and further, we suspect that it may become a vehicle for sustaining the established norms, even if the norms are unjust.
Conclusions:
The "ethicality" of third party roles are determined in the scope of what is considered to be the social function of third party intervention. In third party intervention as a profession, neutrality to parties, process and outcome is a crucial criteria for any role. Thus only those roles that would not jeopardize the neutrality of third party are regarded as ethical.
For those who believe that third party intervention should affect the social and political power imbalance, ethical roles are not tied to neutrality; instead their "ethicality" is measured by their effectiveness in empowering the weak and making justice.
Finally, for those who believe that common good and norms for just society exist, an ethical intervention would be one that guides parties to resolve their conflicts in light of what is regarded as common good.
The variation, based on what social function you choose, in determining what roles of intervention are ethical or not lead us to conclude this section with the title we chose for our presentation: Is it ethics or personal style?
by: Amr Abdalla
Before discussing those factors, let us clarify that "third parties enter a conflict relationship in which the disputants have different expectations, goals, costs, and rewards, and where they experience pressures and stresses stemming from an uncertain situation, or from over-eager constituents. To propose a watertight set of categories for the intervention of third parties, without taking these factors into consideration, is in reality a futile intellectual flight of fancy, or merely an exercise in normative thinking." (Bercovitch, p.16, 1984).
The Social function of the Third Party Role and its Effect on the Concept of Neutrality:
We will summarize three positions in regard to the social functions of third party roles: 1) the Professional Position, 2) the Empowering Position, and 3) the Common Good Position. For each, we will also discuss the implications of their social views and their concepts of neutrality on different third party roles.
1. The Professional Position: This position is mainly represented by the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR). According to SPIDR, a third party is, and could not be anything other than, neutral. This is because a third party (called the Neutral in the SPIDR literature) "is a provider of services to others. The particular service a neutral provides is the use of conflict resolution skills and the neutral's status as a "disinterested" third party to assist in the resolution of disputes....The neutral who is a member of SPIDR is a member of the dispute resolution profession." (Making the Tough Call, p.6, 1991).
This view of the third party as a professional "conflict resolver" has several implications on the roles which the third party could perform. Because neutrality and disinterest are the major qualifications, a third party may intervene only in a manner that does not violate those qualifications. A third party basically assists the parties, who own the dispute and the process, to reach an agreement. Thus, mediation and arbitration are the main (only?) types of intervention.
Within those roles, the ability of the third party to deal with issues of empowerment, social change, or justice are limited. SPIDR provides very few mechanisms to deal with issues such as those mentioned. This is consistent with the emphasis on neutrality and disinterest. A third party who believes that one party is disempowered, or who believes that the outcome is unjust, may do one of two things: 1) educate the disempowered party on the process or the consequences of the outcome, or 2) withdraw. Any other roles would seem to violate the principles of neutrality and disinterest.
This Professional position was, naturally, criticized by those who advocate the empowering and common good aspects of third party intervention. Laue and Cormick, in emphasizing the importance of the political empowerment of disadvantaged parties, stated that "many intervenors...perceive their role as one of aiding in the process of making concessions in the allocation of resources rather than in helping to significantly empower powerless groups. In this regard, many professional intervenors are similar to most establishment parties: They wrongly see resources alone rather than power as the arena for change." (Laue and Cormick, p.229-230, 1978).
2. The Empowering Position: This position is held mainly by James Laue and Gerald Cormick. They determined that "justice is the ultimate social good." (Laue and Cormick, p.219, 1978). A third party intervention in community disputes should, through empowering the disadvantaged, lead to justice, which is the "prerequisite to the maximum attainment of freedom by all individuals." (Laue and Cormick, p.219, 1978). Further, their criteria for an ethical intervention is based on how it contributes "to the ability of relatively powerless individuals and groups in the situation to determine their own destinies to the greatest extent consistent with the common good." (Laue and Cormick, p.217, 1978). For them, proportional empowerment is a crucial value, upon which any successful intervention rests. As they stated, proportional empowerment "refers to a condition in which all groups have developed their latent power to the point where they can advocate their own needs and rights, where they are capable of protecting their boundaries from wanton violation by others, where they are capable of negotiating their way with other empowered groups on the sure footing of respect rather than charity. Given the fallibility of judges, sociologists, politicians, philosophers, and theologians, we can only trust that true substantive justice will flow from the procedural safeguard of proportional empowerment." (Laue and Cormick, p.220, 1978).
Based on their assumptions about the social functions of intervention, Laue and Cormick provided a larger spectrum of intervention roles. A third party plays the role that would more likely achieve the goals of empowerment and justice, even if it was not a neutral one. Thus, activism and advocacy for the cause of weaker parties in order to empower them, may be more proper than mediation or enforcement. Playing the role of a mediator, when empowerment of one party is needed, would be unethical, because it reinforces the unjust status quo.
The Empowerment position also was criticized by others who fear that too much emphasis on empowering the weak through third party intervention may become self defeating. According to Luban (1988) "too much empowering activity on the part of neutrals will lead to under-utilization of Alternative Dispute Resolution by the more powerful parties who find themselves getting goosed by the process." (Luban, p.50, 1981). In addition, Luban, like those representing the Professional position, could only perceive of a third party as neutral. Thus, he warns against mixing the role of advocacy (for empowering the weak) with other "neutral" third party roles, because advocacy, by its nature, neglects at least the interests of one party, even if that party were powerful.
The Common Good Position: This position is actually a critical modification of the Empowerment position. According to Williams (1978), social justice as the ultimate good is the goal of intervention in community disputes. However, empowerment, proportional empowerment, and participation will not necessarily lead to that destination. Williams stated that "neither participation nor competition...will significantly alter the stigma of race and the burden of poverty. Only if greater attention is given to formulation of an adequate conception of the common good or just society will the possibility of significant change emerge. In addition, a notion of the common good or just society would act to limit the misuse of power or coercion by the community or the parties to the dispute. Competition has replaced cooperation and conflict has ensued precisely because... the conception of legitimacy of power has broken down. Consequently, one aspect of the ethical responsibility of the intervenor is to restore the notion of common good that both parties to the dispute might come to acknowledge as valid and that can serve to set limits to the aspirations of all community members as well as provide a normative definition of the just society." (Williams, p.236, 1978).
Unlike Laue and Cormick, Williams did not provide models of intervention that are guided by his ethical framework. However, it may be inferred from his argument that the only ethical model of intervention would be one that upholds the common good as its constitution, to which the intervenor attempts to get the parties to accept as grounds for resolving their dispute. As he stated "the intervenor should be urged to formulate over against the parties some general conception of what seems fair or right in a particular situation. Such a tentative conception of a common good would not prevent joint determination by the parties in dispute. It would suggest instead some reasonable expectations about the transfer of power that ought to occur in the negotiations." (Williams, p.237, 1978). Thus, neutrality becomes a matter of adhering to the common good while not favoring any of the parties.
The Common Good position, although represents most of the actual conflict resolution techniques in traditional societies, would face difficulties in modern diverse societies, where the notion of common good may be too vague. Although this approach is full of good intentions, we doubt that it could stand the test of reality; and further, we suspect that it may become a vehicle for sustaining the established norms, even if the norms are unjust.
Conclusions:
The "ethicality" of third party roles are determined in the scope of what is considered to be the social function of third party intervention. In third party intervention as a profession, neutrality to parties, process and outcome is a crucial criteria for any role. Thus only those roles that would not jeopardize the neutrality of third party are regarded as ethical.
For those who believe that third party intervention should affect the social and political power imbalance, ethical roles are not tied to neutrality; instead their "ethicality" is measured by their effectiveness in empowering the weak and making justice.
Finally, for those who believe that common good and norms for just society exist, an ethical intervention would be one that guides parties to resolve their conflicts in light of what is regarded as common good.
The variation, based on what social function you choose, in determining what roles of intervention are ethical or not lead us to conclude this section with the title we chose for our presentation: Is it ethics or personal style?
by: Amr Abdalla
